



1 Introduction

Key Protocol (NSPK, [18, 23]), as well as variants of the prot

2.2 Context-sensitive Properties

All used identifiers must be different from the IF keywords (step, section, intruder, equal, leq, not, state). The identifiers for types (

that the form of IF rules we have defined here is indeed compatible with our lazy intruder approach.

The rest of the semantics is straightforward: we have one or m

SID: nat
NA, NB, na, nb, ni : nonce

section inits:

```
initial_state init1 :=  
  i knows(i).  
  % session 1 [A: a, B: b, KA: ka, KB: kb]  
  state_Alice(0, a, b, ka, kb, ni, ni, 1).  
  state_Bob(0, b, a, kb, ka, ni, ni, 2).  
  i knows(a). i knows(b). i knows(ka). i knows(kb).  
  % session 2 [A: a, B: i, KA: ka, KB: ki]  
  state_Alice(0, a, b, ka, ki, ni, ni, 3).
```

D2.3. The Intermediate Format

names of the involved agents, their public keys, their nonces, and a session identifier. This identifier is necessary to allow for several parallel sessions between the same agents, as it is similarly necessary in the c

state_Alice(0, A, B, KA, KS, ni, ni, Keyset, SID).

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, ntl inD(tai D(B, KD), ceScKD4(<. 2009(t). 70a9(I). 009(())m70s7(D). 00a9(I)ITLT*[6

6 Conclusion

The IF is a low-level, simple but expressive language for specifying security protocols and their properties. IF specifications can be generated automatically by the HPSL2IF translator from specifications written in the high-level

