

H.530: Symmetric security procedures for H.323 mobility in H.510

Original version

Protocol Purpose

Problems considered: 3

Attacks Found

A replay attack, as *AuF*'s reply to the authentication request from *VGK* does not contain enough information that *VGK* can read. The attack works by first observing a session between honest agents and then replaying messages from this session to *VGK*, posing both as *MT* and *AuF*. Use option `sessco` to find this attack with OFMC. Another attack recently discovered with OFMC is based on the fact that *VGK*


```
ZZ_VA      : symmetric_key,
NIL, G     : text)
played_by VGK def=

local
  State      : nat,
  GX, Key, Key1' 304-105814(na)1my1' 3sym
```



```
/\ authenticationFacility(MT, VGK, AuF, SND, RCV, F, ZZ, ZZ_VA, NIL, G)
/\ visitedGateKeeper(MT, VGK, AuF, SND, RCV, F, ZZ_VA, NIL, G)
```

```
end role
```

```
role environment()
def=
```

```
const
  a, b, auf      : agent,
  f              : function,
  kekekea, b, tint
```

