

We ignore length field (as it cannot be, yet, expressed in HLPSL), use fresh nonce to model RDM, and assume 'DelayedAuthReq' token is enough to specify alrithm, type of auth, and type of RDM.

The server returns the nonce + 1 (or succ(nonce) to be exact) instead of a timestamp with a higher value.

Problems considered: 2

init State := 0

transition

1. State = 0
 \wedge Rcv(C.delayedAuthReq, Time1')
 = $|>$
 State' := 1
 \wedge Sig' := H(S, delayedAuthReq, succ(Time1'), K)
 \wedge Snd(S.delayedAuthReq, succ(Time1').KeyID(K).Sig')
 \wedge witness(S, C, sig, Sig')

end role

role session(C, S : agent,
 H, KeyID : function,
 K : text)

def=

local SA, RA, SB, RB : channel (dy)

composition

dhcp_Delayed_Server(S, C, H, KeyID, K, SA, RA) \wedge
dhcp_Delayed_Client(C, S, H, KeyID, K, SB, RB)

end role

role environment()

def=

const a, b : agent,

k3}

composition

 session(a, b, h, keyid, k1)
 ∧ session(a, i, h, keyid, k2)
 ∧ session(i, b, h, keyid, k3)

end role

goal

 secrecy_of sec_k

 %DHCP_Delayed_Client authenticates DHCP_Delayed_Server on sig
 authentication_on sig

end goal

environment()

References