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@COMMENT written by Patrick Riley
@inproceedings{dj-csfw2004,
abstract = {We consider the problem of automating proofs of
cryptographic protocols when some data, like poorly
chosen passwords, can be guessed by dictionary
attacks. First, we define a theory of these attacks:
we introduce an inference system modeling the
guessing capabilities of an intruder. This system
extends the classical Dolev-Yao rules. Using proof
rewriting techniques, we show a locality lemma for
our inference system which yields the
PTIME-completeness of the deduction problem.\par This
result is lifted to the simultaneous solving of
intruder deduction constraints with variables.
Constraint solving is the basis of a NP algorithm for
the protocol insecurity problem in the presence of
dictionary attacks, assuming a bounded number of
sessions. This extends the classical NP-completeness
result for the Dolev-Yao model.\par We illustrate the
procedure with examples of published protocols. The
model and decision algorithm have been validated on
some examples in a prototype implementation.},
address = {Asilomar, Pacific Grove, California, USA},
author = {Delaune, St{\'e}phanie and Jacquemard, Florent},
booktitle = {{P}roceedings of the 17th {IEEE} {C}omputer
{S}ecurity {F}oundations {W}orkshop ({CSFW}'04)},
month = jun,
pages = {2-15},
publisher = {{IEEE} Computer Society Press},
title = {A Theory of Dictionary Attacks and its Complexity},
year = {2004},
acronym = {{CSFW}'04},
nmonth = {6},
longpdf = {http://people.irisa.fr/Stephanie.Delaune/PUBLICATIONS/rr-lsv-2004-1.rr.pdf},
}