Narrowing-Based Constraint Solving for the Verification of Security Protocols

Stéphanie Delaune and Florent Jacquemard. Narrowing-Based Constraint Solving for the Verification of Security Protocols. In Proceedings of the 18th International Workshop on Unification (UNIF'04), Cork, Ireland, July 2004.

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Abstract

We investigate the resolution of a class of symbolic constraints modulo an equational theory presented by a convergent rewriting system. These constraints are combinations of first-order equations and so-called deduction constraints which can be seen as restricted second-order unification problems. We propose an inference system based on basic narrowing techniques for deciding satisfiability of such constraints, and show its completeness and termination when the rewrite system satisfies some syntactic restrictions.
This result is applied to show NP-completeness of the cryptographic protocols insecurity problem for a bounded number of sessions, when the protocol and intruder semantics are defined by an arbitrary convergent rewrite system in our class. This generalizes former results, as we show that the use of parameterized semantics permits to weaken the security hypotheses for verification, i.e. to address a larger class of attacks.

BibTeX

@inproceedings{dj-unif2004,
  abstract =      {We investigate the resolution of a class of symbolic
                   constraints modulo an equational theory presented by
                   a convergent rewriting system. These constraints are
                   combinations of first-order equations and so-called
                   deduction constraints which can be seen as restricted
                   second-order unification problems. We propose an
                   inference system based on basic narrowing techniques
                   for deciding satisfiability of such constraints, and
                   show its completeness and termination when the
                   rewrite system satisfies some syntactic
                   restrictions.\par This result is applied to show
                   NP-completeness of the cryptographic protocols
                   insecurity problem for a bounded number of sessions,
                   when the protocol and intruder semantics are defined
                   by an arbitrary convergent rewrite system in our
                   class. This generalizes former results, as we show
                   that the use of parameterized semantics permits to
                   weaken the security hypotheses for verification, i.e.
                   to address a larger class of attacks.},
  address =       {Cork, Ireland},
  author =        {Delaune, St{\'e}phanie and Jacquemard, Florent},
  booktitle =     {{P}roceedings of the 18th {I}nternational {W}orkshop
                   on {U}nification ({UNIF}'04)},
  editor =        {Kohlhase, Michael},
  month =         jul,
  title =         {Narrowing-Based Constraint Solving for the
                   Verification of Security Protocols},
  year =          {2004},
  acronym =       {{UNIF}'04},
  nmonth =        {7},
 }