From security protocols to pushdown automata

Rémy Chrétien, Véronique Cortier, and Stéphanie Delaune. From security protocols to pushdown automata. In Proceedings of the 40th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming (ICALP'13) -- Part II, pp. 137–149, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 7966, Springer, Riga, Latvia, July 2013.

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Abstract

Formal methods have been very successful in analyzing security protocols for reachability properties such as secrecy or authentication. In contrast, there are very few results for equivalence-based properties, crucial for studying e.g. privacy-like properties such as anonymity or vote secrecy.
We study the problem of checking equivalence of security protocols for an unbounded number of sessions. Since replication leads very quickly to undecidability (even in the simple case of secrecy), we focus on a limited fragment of protocols (standard primitives but pairs, one variable per protocol's rules) for which the secrecy preservation problem is known to be decidable. Surprisingly, this fragment turns out to be undecidable for equivalence. Then, restricting our attention to deterministic protocols, we propose the first decidability result for checking equivalence of protocols for an unbounded number of sessions. This result is obtained through a characterization of equivalence of protocols in terms of equality of languages of (generalized, real-time) deterministic pushdown automata.

BibTeX

@inproceedings{CCD-icalp13,
  abstract =      {Formal methods have been very successful in analyzing
                   security protocols for reachability properties such
                   as secrecy or authentication. In contrast, there are
                   very few results for equivalence-based properties,
                   crucial for studying e.g. privacy-like properties
                   such as anonymity or vote secrecy.\par We study the
                   problem of checking equivalence of security protocols
                   for an unbounded number of sessions. Since
                   replication leads very quickly to undecidability
                   (even in the simple case of secrecy), we focus on a
                   limited fragment of protocols (standard primitives
                   but pairs, one variable per protocol's rules) for
                   which the secrecy preservation problem is known to be
                   decidable. Surprisingly, this fragment turns out to
                   be undecidable for equivalence. Then, restricting our
                   attention to deterministic protocols, we propose the
                   first decidability result for checking equivalence of
                   protocols for an unbounded number of sessions. This
                   result is obtained through a characterization of
                   equivalence of protocols in terms of equality of
                   languages of (generalized, real-time) deterministic
                   pushdown automata.},
  address =       {Riga, Latvia},
  author =        {Chr{\'e}tien, R{\'e}my and Cortier, V{\'e}ronique and
                   Delaune, St{\'e}phanie},
  booktitle =     {{P}roceedings of the 40th {I}nternational
                   {C}olloquium on {A}utomata, {L}anguages and
                   {P}rogramming ({ICALP}'13)~-- {P}art~{II}},
  OPTDOI =           {10.1007/978-3-642-39212-2_15},
  editor =        {Fomin, Fedor V. and Freivalds, R{\=u}si{\c{n}}{\v{s}} and
                   Kwiatkowska, Marta and Peleg, David},
  month =         jul,
  pages =         {137-149},
  publisher =     {Springer},
  series =        {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
  title =         {From security protocols to pushdown automata},
  volume =        {7966},
  year =          {2013},
  acronym =       {{ICALP}'13},
  nmonth =        {7},
  OPTLONGPDF =       {https://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/Publis/PAPERS/PDF/
                  CCD-icalp13-long.pdf},
  lsv-category =  {intc},
  wwwpublic =     {public and ccsb},
}