Mathilde Arnaud, Véronique Cortier, and Stéphanie Delaune. Modeling and Verifying Ad Hoc Routing Protocols. In Proceedings of the 23rd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF'10), pp. 59–74, IEEE Computer Society Press, Edinburgh, Scotland, UK, July 2010.
Mobile ad hoc networks consist of mobile wireless devices which autonomously organize their infrastructure. In such networks, a central issue, ensured by routing protocols, is to find a route from one device to another. Those protocols use cryptographic mechanisms in order to prevent malicious nodes from compromising the discovered route.
Our contribution is twofold. We first propose a calculus for modeling and reasoning about security protocols, including in particular secured routing protocols. Our calculus extends standard symbolic models to take into account the characteristics of routing protocols and to model wireless communication in a more accurate way. Our second main contribution is a decision procedure for analyzing routing protocols for any network topology. By using constraint solving techniques, we show that it is possible to automatically discover (in NPTIME) whether there exists a network topology that would allow malicious nodes to mount an attack against the protocol, for a bounded number of sessions. We also provide a decision procedure for detecting attacks in case the network topology is given a priori. We demonstrate the usage and usefulness of our approach by analyzing the protocol \textsfSRP applied to \textsfDSR.
@inproceedings{ACD-csf10,
abstract = {Mobile ad hoc networks consist of mobile wireless
devices which autonomously organize their
infrastructure. In such networks, a central issue,
ensured by routing protocols, is to find a route from
one device to another. Those protocols use
cryptographic mechanisms in order to prevent
malicious nodes from compromising the discovered
route.\par Our contribution is twofold. We first
propose a calculus for modeling and reasoning about
security protocols, including in particular secured
routing protocols. Our calculus extends standard
symbolic models to take into account the
characteristics of routing protocols and to model
wireless communication in a more accurate way. Our
second main contribution is a decision procedure for
analyzing routing protocols for any network topology.
By using constraint solving techniques, we show that
it is possible to automatically discover (in NPTIME)
whether there exists a network topology that would
allow malicious nodes to mount an attack against the
protocol, for a bounded number of sessions. We also
provide a decision procedure for detecting attacks in
case the network topology is given a priori. We
demonstrate the usage and usefulness of our approach
by analyzing the protocol \textsf{SRP} applied
to~\textsf{DSR}.},
address = {Edinburgh, Scotland, UK},
author = {Arnaud, Mathilde and Cortier, V{\'e}ronique and
Delaune, St{\'e}phanie},
booktitle = {{P}roceedings of the 23rd {IEEE} {C}omputer
{S}ecurity {F}oundations {S}ymposium ({CSF}'10)},
OPTDOI = {10.1109/CSF.2010.12},
month = jul,
pages = {59-74},
publisher = {{IEEE} Computer Society Press},
title = {Modeling and Verifying Ad Hoc Routing Protocols},
year = {2010},
acronym = {{CSF}'10},
nmonth = {7},
OPTLONGPDF = {https://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/Publis/RAPPORTS_LSV/PDF/
rr-lsv-2010-03.pdf},
lsv-category = {intc},
wwwpublic = {public and ccsb},
}