@COMMENT This file was generated by bib2html.pl version 0.94
@COMMENT written by Patrick Riley
@techreport{Prouve:rap4,
abstract = {Cryptographic protocols are successfully analyzed
using formal methods. However, formal approaches
usually consider the encryption schemes as black
boxes and assume that an adversary cannot learn
anything from an encrypted message except if he has
the key. Such an assumption is too strong in general
since some attacks exploit in a clever way the
interaction between protocol rules and properties of
cryptographic operators. Moreover, the executability
of some protocols relies explicitly on some algebraic
properties of cryptographic primitives such as
commutative encryption. We first give an overview of
the existing methods in formal approaches for
analyzing cryptographic protocols. Then we describe
more precisely the results obtained by the partners
of the RNTL project PROUV\'E.},
author = {Bernat, Vincent and Comon{-}Lundh, Hubert and
Cortier, V{\'e}ronique and Delaune, St{\'e}phanie and
Jacquemard, Florent and Lafourcade, Pascal and
Lakhnech, Yassine and Mazar{\'e}, Laurent},
institution = {projet RNTL PROUV{\'E}},
month = dec,
note = {33~pages},
number = {4},
type = {Technical Report},
title = {Sufficient conditions on properties for an automated
verification: theoretical report on the verification
of protocols for an extended model of the intruder},
year = {2004},
nmonth = {12},
}