Nicolas Markey

Abstract

We investigate a model for representing large multiplayer games, which satisfy strong symmetry properties. This model is made of multiple copies of an arena; each player plays in his own arena, and can partially observe what the other players do. Therefore, this game has partial information and symmetry constraints, which make the computation of Nash equilibria difficult. We show several undecidability results, and for bounded-memory strategies, we precisely characterize the complexity of computing pure Nash equilibria (for qualitative objectives) in this game model.

@inproceedings{sr2014-BMV,
  author =              {Bouyer, Patricia and Markey, Nicolas and Vester,
                         Steen},
  title =               {Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Games with Partial
                         Observation},
  booktitle =           {{P}roceedings of the 2nd {I}nternational {W}orkshop
                         on {S}trategic {R}easoning ({SR}'14)},
  acronym =             {{SR}'14},
  series =              {Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer
                         Science},
  volume =              {146},
  pages =               {49-55},
  year =                {2014},
  month =               mar,
  doi =                 {10.4204/EPTCS.146.7},
  abstract =            {We investigate a model for representing large
                         multiplayer games, which satisfy strong symmetry
                         properties. This model is made of multiple copies of
                         an arena; each player plays in his own arena, and
                         can partially observe what the other players do.
                         Therefore, this game has partial information and
                         symmetry constraints, which make the computation of
                         Nash equilibria difficult. We show several
                         undecidability results, and for bounded-memory
                         strategies, we precisely characterize the complexity
                         of computing pure Nash equilibria (for qualitative
                         objectives) in this game model.},
}