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[BMS14] | Patricia Bouyer,
Nicolas Markey, and
Daniel Stan.
Mixed Nash Equilibria in Concurrent Games.
In FSTTCS'14,
Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics 29, pages 351-363. Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, December 2014.
@inproceedings{fsttcs2014-BMS, author = {Bouyer, Patricia and Markey, Nicolas and Stan, Daniel}, title = {Mixed {N}ash Equilibria in Concurrent Games}, editor = {Raman, Venkatesh and Suresh, S. P.}, booktitle = {{P}roceedings of the 34th {C}onference on {F}oundations of {S}oftware {T}echnology and {T}heoretical {C}omputer {S}cience ({FSTTCS}'14)}, acronym = {{FSTTCS}'14}, publisher = {Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik}, series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics}, volume = {29}, pages = {351-363}, year = {2014}, month = dec, doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2014.351}, abstract = {We study mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in multiplayer deterministic concurrent games played on graphs, with terminal-reward payoffs (that is, absorbing states with a value for each player). We show undecidability of the existence of a constrained Nash equilibrium (the constraint requiring that one player should have maximal payoff), with only three players and 0/1-rewards (i.e., reachability objectives). This has to be compared with the undecidability result by Ummels and Wojtczak for turn-based games which requires 14 players and general rewards. Our proof has various interesting consequences: (i)~the~undecidability of the existence of a Nash equilibrium with a constraint on the social welfare; (ii)~the~undecidability of the existence of an (unconstrained) Nash equilibrium in concurrent games with terminal-reward payoffs.}, } |
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