#### Average-energy games

Patricia Bouyer Nicolas Markey Mickael Randour Kim G. Larsen Simon Laursen Piotr Hofman Martin Zimmermann

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 σ<sub>●</sub>: always go to □ (from ○)
 σ'<sub>●</sub>: alternate between ○ and □ (from ○)

Relevant quantities to control • energy level:  $EL(\pi_{\leq n}) = \sum_{i \leq n} w(s_i \to s_{i+1})$  [aka. total payoff] • mean payoff:  $MP(\pi_{\leq n}) = \frac{1}{n}EL(\pi_{\leq n})$ 

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### Decision problems and known results

#### Decision problems

- total payoff: is there a strategy to have  $\limsup EL \le t$ ?
- mean payoff: is there a strategy to have  $\lim \sup MP \le t$ ?
- energy constraint: is there a strategy to keep  $EL \in [I, u]$ ?

### Decision problems and known results

| Known results           |                  |                                     |
|-------------------------|------------------|-------------------------------------|
| objective               | 1 player         | 2 players                           |
| Mean Payoff             | PTIME [Kar78]    | NP ∩ coNP [ZP96]                    |
| Total Payoff            | PTIME [FV97]     | NP ∩ coNP [GS09]                    |
| $Energy_{[L,+\infty)}$  | PTIME [BFL+08]   | $NP \cap coNP \ [CdAHS03, BFL^+08]$ |
| Energy <sub>[L,U)</sub> | PSPACE-c. [FJ13] | EXPTIME-c [BFL <sup>+</sup> 08]     |

For all except  $Energy_{[L,U]}$ , memoryless strategies are sufficient.

[Kar78] Karp. A characterization of the minimum cycle mean in a digraph. Discr.Math., 1978.
[ZP06] Zwick, Paterson. The complexity of mean payoff games on graphs. TCS, 1996.
[FV97] Filar, Vrieze. Competitive Markov decision processes. Springer, 1997.
[GS09] Gawlitza, Seidl. Games through nested fixpoints. CAV, 2009
[BFL<sup>+</sup>08] Bouyer *et al.* Infinite runs in weighted timed automata with energy constraints. FORMATS, 2008.
[CdAHS03] Chakrabarti *et al.* Resource interfaces. EMSOFT, 2003.
[FJ13] Fearnley, Jurdziński. Reachability in two-clock timed automata is PSPACE-complete. ICALP, 2013.

Outline of the presentation

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### Average-energy objectives: example



[CJL<sup>+</sup>09] Cassez et al. Automatic Synthesis of Robust and Optimal Controllers [...]. HSCC, 2009. < 喜 > < 🚖 >
#### Pressure-tank case study [CJL+09]



#### **Objectives**:

- keep water level within given bounds
- minimize average level

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• mean payoff = average of weight on transitions  $\overline{MP}(\pi_{\leq n}) = \limsup_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{n} EL(\pi_{\leq n})$ • average energy = average of accumulated weight  $\overline{AE}(\pi_{\leq n}) = \limsup_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} EL(\pi_{\leq i})$ 

Related works

• AE defined in [TV87];

[TV87] Thuijsman, Vrieze. The bad match; A total reward stochastic game. OR Spektrum, 1987.

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- AE studied for stochastic models in [BEGM15]

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[BEGM15] Boros *et al.* MDPs and Stochastic Games with Total Effective Payoff. STACS, 2015. <a href="https://www.statuation.com">www.statuation.com</a>

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#### Lemma

$$\overline{AE}(\pi_1 \cdot \pi_2) = EL(\pi_1) + \overline{AE}(\pi_2)$$

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Let  $\pi = \pi_1 \cdot \pi_2 \cdots$  be a sequence of bounded-length bounded-weight zero-cycles. Then

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#### 1-player case: memoryless optimal strategy

Lemma

Memoryless strategies are sufficient for 1-player AE games.

Theorem

1-player AE games can be solved in PTIME.

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#### Algorithm

- compute  $\overline{AE}(\mathcal{C}_{k,s})$  for all simple cycles of length k on s;
- minimize  $EL(\rho_{s_0 \to s}) + \overline{AE}(C_s)$ .

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#### Proof

• for each pair (*s*, *k*), can be solved in PTIME via a linear programming (see next slide).
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- optimal reachability; solvable in PTIME.











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- optimal positional strategy in the one-player games
- result follows from [GZ05].

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AE-games can be solved in NP  $\cap$  coNP.

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AE-games are at least as hard as MP-games.

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Corollary *AE-games can be solved in* NP  $\cap$  coNP.

### Proposition

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### Average-energy games: summary

| objective               | 1 player         | 2 players                           |
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| Mean Payoff             | PTIME [Kar78]    | $NP \cap coNP \ [ZP06]$             |
| Total Payoff            | PTIME [FV97]     | $NP \cap coNP \ [GZ09]$             |
| $Energy_{[L,+\infty)}$  | PTIME [BFL+08]   | $NP \cap coNP \ [CdAHS03, BFL^+08]$ |
| Energy <sub>[L,U)</sub> | PSPACE-c. [FJ13] | EXPTIME-c [BFL <sup>+</sup> 08]     |
| AvgEnergy               | PTIME            | $NP\capcoNP$                        |

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Outline of the presentation

### Example



### Example



### Example



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### Example



### Example



### Example



### Example



### Example



### Example



### Example



### Example

Minimize AE (in the long run) while keeping EL between 0 and 3:



#### Lemma

Memory is needed to win AE+LU games.











#### Lemma

AELU reduces to AE in expanded game.









#### Lemma

AELU reduces to MP in expanded game.



#### Theorem

*1-player AELU-games are in* **EXPTIME**, *and* **PSPACE**-*hard*. *2-player AELU-games are* **EXPTIME**-*complete*.


• Assume there is a winning path;



- Assume there is a winning path;
- There is a repeated configuration;



- Assume there is a winning path;
- There is a repeated configuration;
- One of the resulting cycle has low average energy;



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- There is a repeated configuration;
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- Reachability requires pseudo-polynomial peak height;





#### Theorem

The AEL-problem is in PSPACE, and NP-hard, for 1-player games.

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#### Theorem

2-player AEL games are in 2-EXPTIME, and EXPSPACE-hard.

#### Conclusions and future works

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| AvgEnergy               | PTIME              | $NP\capcoNP$                    |
| $AE+E_{[L,\infty)}$     | EXPTIME, NP-h.     | 2-EXPTIME, EXPSPACE-h.          |
| $AE + E_{[L,U)}$        | EXPTIME, PSPACE-h. | EXPTIME-c.                      |

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#### Future work

- close complexity gaps;
- extend to stochastic setting;
- extend to timed setting.