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# DEFINABILITY IN THE MONADIC SECOND-ORDER THEORY OF SUCCESSOR ${ }^{1}$ 

J. RICHARD BÜCHI and LAWRENCE H. LANDWEBER

§1. Introduction. Let $\mathscr{D}=\left\langle D, P_{1}, P_{2}, \cdots\right\rangle$ be a relational system whereby $D$ is a nonempty set and $P_{i}$ is an $m_{i}$-ary relation on $D$. With $\mathscr{D}$ we associate the (weak) monadic second-order theory $(W) M T[\mathscr{D}]$ consisting of the first-order predicate calculus with individual variables ranging over $D$; monadic predicate variables ranging over (finite) subsets of $D$; monadic predicate quantifiers; and constants corresponding to $P_{1}, P_{2}, \cdots$. We will often use ( $W$ ) $M T[\mathscr{D}]$ ambiguously to mean also the set of true sentences of $(W) M T[\mathscr{D}]$.
In this note we study variants of the structure $\left\langle N,{ }^{\prime}\right\rangle$ where $N$ is the set of natural numbers and ' is the successor function on $N$. Our results are a consequence of McNaughton's [7] work on the $\omega$-behavior of finite automata and the decision procedure for $M T$ [ $N$, '] given in [1]. The former is essential as we have been unable to obtain proofs which utilize only [1]'s characterization of $\omega$-behavior. In [2] we discuss related results.
$\S 2$ studies definability in $M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}\right]$. For every formula $C(X)$ of $M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}\right]$ where $X$ is a vector of unary predicate variables, the relation $C(X)$ is arithmetic and, in fact, is in the Boolean algebra over $\Pi_{2}$. In $\S 3$, we investigate the existence of decision procedures for $(W) M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}, Q\right]$ where $Q$ is a subset of $N$. Such theories were previously studied by Elgot and Rabin [4]. For any recursive $Q$, the decision problem for $M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}, Q\right]$ is in $\Sigma_{3} \cap \Pi_{3}$. We also define a recursive $Q$ for which $(W) M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}, Q\right]$ is undecidable. This provides a rather natural example of an undecidable theory which is still arithmetic.
§2. Definability in $M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}\right]$. In this section we study definability in $M T[N$, '] with respect to the arithmetic and classical Borel hierarchies. In particular we are interested in those relations definable by formulas $C(X), X$ a vector of free monadic predicate variables, of $M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}\right]$. The main result is that every such relation is in the Boolean algebra over $\Pi_{2}$ of the arithmetic hierarchy. In fact, Lemma 1 below also gives this result for a wider class of $C(X)$ than are definable in $M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}\right]$. In the following $x, y, z, \cdots$ are individual variables ranging over $N$.

Let $\Pi_{0}$ be the class of recursive relations on $N^{n} \times P(N)^{k}$ where $P(N)$ is the power set of $N . \Pi_{1}\left(\Pi_{2}\right)$ is the class of relations presentable in the form $(\forall y) C\left(y, x_{1}, \cdots, x_{n}, X_{1}, \cdots, X_{k}\right)\left((\exists z)(\forall y) C\left(z, y, x_{1}, \cdots, x_{n}, X_{1}, \cdots, X_{k}\right)\right)$ where $C$ denotes a recursive relation. Relations in $\Pi_{3}, \Pi_{4}, \cdots$ are obtained by prefixing additional alternating quantifiers to relations in $\Pi_{2}$. The classes

[^0]$\Pi_{0}, \Pi_{1}, \cdots$ comprise the arithmetic hierarchy. It is well known that $\Pi_{i+1}-\Pi_{i} \neq \varnothing$ for all $i$. Moreover, if $\Sigma_{i}$ is the class of relations whose complements are in $\Pi_{i}$, then for all $i, \Pi_{i} \subset \Pi_{i+1} \cap \Sigma_{i+1}$. We refer the reader to Kleene [6] and Rogers [9, Chapters 14-15] for a complete discussion of the properties of the arithmetic hierarchy.

A formula $C\left(x_{1}, \cdots, x_{n}, X_{1}, \cdots, X_{k}\right)$ of $M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}\right]$ is in $\Pi_{k}\left(\Sigma_{k}\right)$ if the corresponding relation is in $\Pi_{k}\left(\Sigma_{k}\right)$. To simplify the notation we do not distinguish between formulas and the relations they define. $X$ is always used as an abbreviation for a vector of unary predicate variables. We implicitly use the obvious correspondence between $\omega$-sequences on $\{T, F\}^{k}, k$-tuples of unary predicates on $N$ and $k$-tuples of subsets of $N$. Let $I_{n}=\{T, F\}^{n} . I_{n}^{*}$ is the set of finite sequences on $I_{n}$. To simplify the notation we omit the subscript on $I_{n}$.

A recursive operator (RO) $Z=\mathscr{A}(X)$ is an operator mapping $\omega$-sequences over the finite set $I=\{T, F\}^{n}$ into $\omega$-sequences over a finite set $S$ which can be presented in the form

$$
\begin{equation*}
Z t=\Phi(\bar{X} \phi(t)) \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

whereby $\bar{X} t=X 0 \cdots X t$ and $\Phi$ and $\phi$ are recursive functions from $I^{*}$ into $S$ and from $N$ into $N$ respectively. Sup $Z$ is the set of members of $S$ appearing infinitely often in the $\omega$-sequence $Z=Z 0, Z 1, \cdots$.

Lemma 1. Let $Z=\mathscr{A}(X)$ be a $R O$ and $U \subseteq 2^{S}$. Then the relation $F(X)$ given by

$$
\begin{equation*}
(\exists Z)[Z=\mathscr{A}(X) \wedge \sup Z \in U] \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

is in the Boolean algebra over $\Pi_{2}$ of the arithmetic hierarchy.
Proof. $F(X)$ can be written as

$$
\bigvee_{B \in U} \cdot(\exists x)(\forall y)[y \geq x \supset \Phi(\bar{X} \phi(y)) \in B] \wedge \bigwedge_{s \in B}(\forall x)(\exists y)[y \geq x \wedge \Phi(\bar{X} \phi(y))=s]
$$

The relations given by $[y \geq x \wedge \Phi(\bar{X} \phi(y))=s]$ and $[y \geq x \supset \Phi(\bar{X} \phi(y)) \in B]$ are recursive because $\Phi$ and $\phi$ are recursive. Hence $F(X)$ is a Boolean combination of formulas of the form $(\forall y)(\exists x) M(X, x, y)$ where $M$ is recursive so $F(X)$ is in the Boolean algebra over $\Pi_{2}$.
Q.E.D.

A finite automata operator (FAO) is a $\mathrm{RO} Z=\mathscr{A}(X)$ which can be presented in the form

$$
\begin{equation*}
Z 0=c, \quad Z t^{\prime}=H[X t, Z t] \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

whereby $H: I \times S \rightarrow S$ and $c \in S$. Let $C(X)$ be a formula of $M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}\right]$. The main definability results of [1] and [7] (see [2] for more details) state that from $C$ we can effectively construct a presentation of a FAO $Z=\mathscr{E}(X)$ as in (3) (i.e., obtain $H, S$, and $c$ ) and a $U \subseteq 2^{S}$ such that

$$
C(X) . \equiv .(\exists Z)[Z=\mathscr{E}(X) \wedge \sup Z \in U]
$$

Hence by Lemma 1 we have
Theorem 1. Every relation between subsets of $N$ which is definable in $M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}\right]$ is arithmetical, and in fact occurs in the Boolean algebra over $\Pi_{2}$. Furthermore, given a formula $C\left(X_{1}, \cdots, X_{n}\right)$ of $M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}\right]$ one can construct an index of the relation $C$ in the Boolean algebra over $\Pi_{2}$.

In contrast, all relations $R\left(y_{1}, \cdots, y_{m}, X_{1}, \cdots, X_{n}\right)$ appearing in the functionquantifier hierarchy over recursive relations are definable in $M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}, 2 x\right]$ (see [8]).

We can also consider $C(X)$ as defining a subset of the Cantor space of $\omega$ sequences over $I$, namely, the set of $\omega$-sequences over $I$ which satisfy $C$. Those sets that are both open and closed in the usual totally disconnected topology on this space are of the form $U_{w_{1}} \cup \cdots \cup U_{w_{n}}$ whereby $w_{i} \in I^{*}$ and $U_{w}=$ $\{X \mid(\exists t)[\bar{X} t=w]\}$. A set is open if it is a denumerable union of sets which are both open and closed. $G_{\delta}\left(F_{\sigma}\right)$ is the class of sets which are denumerable intersections (unions) of open (closed) sets. $G_{\delta \sigma}, G_{\delta \sigma \delta}, \cdots$ and $F_{\sigma \delta}, F_{\sigma \delta \sigma}, \cdots$ sets are defined in the obvious manner. The Borel hierarchy is the increasing sequence of classes $G, G_{\delta}$, $G_{\delta \sigma}, \cdots$ (see [9, Chapter 15] for a comparison of the Borel and arithmetic hierarchies).

If $C$ is recursive, there is an effective procedure which decides whether $C(X)$ or $\sim C(X)$ is true after being given some finite portion $\bar{X} t=X 0 \cdots X t$ of $X$. Hence, if $X_{0}$ is such that $\bar{X}_{0} t=\bar{X} t$, then $C(X) \equiv C\left(X_{0}\right)$. This implies that every recursive set of $X$ 's is open and closed. But every $C(X)$ of $M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}\right]$ is a Boolean combination of expressions of the form $(\forall x)(\exists y) M(x, y, X)$ where for fixed $x$ and $y \mathscr{X} M(x, y, X)$ is open and closed (since $M$ is recursive). Thus by Theorem 1 we obtain

Corollary 1. If $C(X)$ is a formula of $M T[N, ']$, then the relation $C(X)$ is in the Boolean algebra over $G_{\delta}$ of the Borel hierarchy.

We conclude this section with an example of a $C(X)$ of $M T[N, ']$ which is neither a $G_{\delta}$ nor an $F_{\sigma}$ (and therefore neither a $\Sigma_{2}$ nor a $\Pi_{2}$ ). The following remark is observed in [3].
(1) A set $C(X)$ is a $G_{\delta}$, if and only if, there is a set $W$ of words over $I$ such that $C(X)$ holds if and only if $w<X$ for infinitely many $w \in W$.
Here $w<X(w$ is initial segment of $X)$ stands for $(\exists t) \bar{X} t=w$. Now define $C(X)$ by,

$$
\begin{equation*}
[X 0 \wedge(\forall x)(\exists y)[x \leq y \wedge X y]] \vee[\sim X 0 \wedge(\exists x)(\forall y)[x \leq y \supset \sim X y]] . \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

Suppose $C$ is a $G_{\delta}$. Then, by (1), there exists a $W \subseteq I^{*}$ such that

$$
\begin{equation*}
C(X) . \equiv . W \cap\{w \mid w<X\} \text { is infinite } . \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

Define the sequence $w_{0}, w_{1}, w_{2}, \cdots$ by

$$
\begin{align*}
w_{0} & =\text { shortest } v, v \in W \wedge v \text { of form } F F^{k},  \tag{4}\\
w_{n+1} & =\text { shortest } v, v \in W \wedge v \text { of form } w_{n} T F F^{k}
\end{align*}
$$

By (2) $F^{\omega}$ belongs to $C$, therefore by (3) $w_{0}$ exists and $F \leq w_{0}$. Assume inductively that $w_{n}$ exists and $F \leq w_{n}$. Then by (2) $w_{n} T F^{\omega}$ belongs to $C$, therefore by (3) $w_{n+1}$ exists and $F \leq w_{n+1}$. Thus (4) really defines a sequence of words, and clearly $w_{i} \in W, F \leq w_{0}<w_{1}<w_{2} \cdots$. Thus, by (3) and (2), the sequence $Y$ having all $w_{i}$ 's as initial segments belong to $C$. But this is contradictory, as $Y$ starts with $F$ and has infinitely many $T$ 's. Thus $C \notin G_{\delta}$, and similarly one shows $\sim C \notin G_{\delta}$. But $x \leq y$ is definable in $M T$ [ $N,{ }^{\prime}$ ], and therefore $C$ is. Consequently, (2) provides an example of a set $C$, definable in $M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}\right]$, but neither in $G_{\delta}$ nor $F_{\sigma}$.
§3. Decision problems for extensions of $M T[N, ']$. Elgot and Rabin [4] have studied the existence of decision procedures for extensions of $M T$ [ $N$, ']. In parti-
cular they have shown that $M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}, Q\right]$ is decidable if $Q$ is either of $\left\{x^{k} \mid x \in N\right\}$, $\left\{k^{x} \mid x \in N\right\}$ or $\{x!\mid x \in N\}$ where $k$ is a fixed natural number. The results are obtained by reducing the decision problem for $M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}, Q\right]$ to that for $M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}\right]$ and then applying the procedure given in [1]. If $Q=\{(x, 2 x) \mid x \in N\}$, then the corresponding weak monadic theory is undecidable [8].

Let $Q$ be a subset of $N$. If $W M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}, Q\right]$ is undecidable, then so is $M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}, Q\right]$. This follows from the definability of ' $X$ is a finite set' in $M T[N$, '], by the formula $(\exists x)(\forall t)[t \geq x \supset \sim X t]$ where $t \geq x$ is an abbreviation of $(\forall Y), Y t \wedge$ $(\forall w)\left[Y w^{\prime} \supset Y w\right] \supset Y x$.

If $Q$ is not recursive, then $W M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}, Q\right]$ is undecidable (e.g., $0^{\prime \cdots \prime} \in Q$ can not be effectively decided). If $Q$ is recursive, the hierarchy result of $\S 2$ can be applied to give an upper bound to the complexity of decision problems for $M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}, Q\right]$. $\psi(y, Z)$ is a universal predicate for $\Pi_{2}$ if for each $P(Z) \in \Pi_{2}$, there is an $e_{p}$ such that for all $Z, \psi\left(e_{p}, Z\right) \equiv P(Z)$.

Theorem 2. If $Q$ is recursive, then truth in $M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}, Q\right]$ is in $\Sigma_{3} \cap \Pi_{3}$.
Proof. Let $\Psi(e, Z)$ be a universal predicate for all predicates $P(Z)$ in $\Pi_{2}$, which is itself in $\Pi_{2}$ [6]. By Theorem 1, there is a recursive function $B$ which maps every formula $\Phi(Z)$ of $M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}\right]$ into a Boolean expression $B_{\Phi}$, and a recursive function $f$ which maps every formula $\Phi(Z)$ of $M T[N, ']$ into a finite sequence $f_{\Phi}=\left\langle f_{\Phi, 1}, \cdots, f_{\Phi, n}\right\rangle$ of numbers, such that for any $Z \subseteq N$,
(1) $\Phi(Z)$ holds in $M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}\right], \equiv B_{\Phi}\left[\Psi\left(f_{\Phi, 1}, Z\right), \cdots, \Psi\left(f_{\Phi, n}, Z\right)\right]$.

Let $\chi(e)$ stand for $\Psi(e, Q)$, and note that because $\Psi \in \Pi_{2}$ and $Q$ is recursive it follows that $\chi \in \Pi_{2}$. Furthermore, (1) may be restated as,

$$
\begin{equation*}
\Phi(Q) \text { holds in } M T\left[N,,^{\prime}, Q\right] . \equiv . B_{\Phi}\left[\chi\left(f_{\Phi, 1}\right), \cdots, \chi\left(f_{\Phi, n}\right)\right] . \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

Note that the functions $B, f$ are recursive, and all sentences of $M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}, Q\right]$ are of form $\Phi(Q)$ where $\Phi(Z)$ is a formula of $M T[N, ']$. It follows that (2) provides for a recursive reduction of $\left\{\Sigma \mid \Sigma\right.$ true in $\left.M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}, Q\right]\right\}$ to the set $\chi$ (i.e. a Turing machine can be built which, given a sentence $\Sigma$ of $M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}, Q\right]$ and an oracle for membership in $\chi$, decides whether or not $\Sigma$ is true). Thus, truth in $M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}, Q\right]$ is reducible to some $\chi \in \Pi_{2}$. It follows, by a well-known result of Post (see [9, p. 314]), that truth in $M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}, Q\right]$ belongs to $\Sigma_{3} \cap \Pi_{3}$.
Q.E.D.

Theorem 2 shows that for no recursive $Q$ is it possible to prove $M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}, Q\right]$ undecidable by the standard method of showing that all recursive relations are definable.

If $Q$ is the set of primes, then $(\forall x)(\exists y)\left[y>x \wedge Q(y) \wedge Q\left(y^{\prime \prime}\right)\right]$ states the twin prime problem in $M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}, Q\right]$. Indeed, this sentence is in the first order theory of $\left\langle N,{ }^{\prime},<, Q\right\rangle$. Hence, the problem as to whether ( $W$ ) $M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}\right.$, primes] is decidable, would seem very difficult. Namely, a positive answer would settle the twin prime problem, while on the negative side, the standard methods of proving theories undecidable is not available.
Theorem 3. There is a recursive $Q$ such that $W M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}, Q\right]$ is undecidable. ${ }^{2}$
Proof. Let $R$ be a recursively enumerable set of primes which is not recursive. Let $r_{1}, r_{2}, \cdots$ be a recursive enumeration of $R$ and let $Q_{0}=\left\{r_{i}^{2} p_{i} \mid i=1,2, \cdots\right\}$,

[^1]whereby $p_{i}$ is the $i$ th prime. $Q_{0}$ is obviously recursive. To prove that $W M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}, Q_{0}\right]$ is undecidable it is sufficient to show that the first order theory ( $F T$ ) of $\left\langle N, M_{1}, M_{2}, \cdots, Q_{0}\right\rangle$ is undecidable whereby $M_{k}$ stands for the set of multiples of $k$. Just note that each $M_{k}$ is definable in $W M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}, Q_{0}\right]$ by the formula
$$
M_{k}(w):(\forall X) \cdot X w \wedge(\forall y)[X(y+k) \supset X y] \supset X 0
$$

From the definition of $R$ and $Q_{0}$ we obtain

$$
\begin{equation*}
R(k) . \equiv . k \neq 1 \wedge(\exists y)\left[M_{k^{2}}(y) \wedge Q_{0}(y)\right] \tag{}
\end{equation*}
$$

Let $\Sigma_{k}$ be the sentence $k \neq 1 \wedge(\exists y)\left[M_{k^{2}}(y) \wedge Q_{0}(y)\right]$. By (*) $\Sigma_{k}$ is true in $F T\left[N, M_{1}, M_{2}, \cdots, Q_{0}\right.$ ] if and only if $k \in R$. But $R$ is not recursive so there is no effective procedure for deciding truth in $F T\left[N, M_{1}, M_{2}, \cdots, Q_{0}\right]$. Q.E.D.

Problem 1. Is there an 'interesting' recursive $Q$ such that $(W) M T[N, ', Q]$ is undecidable? How about $Q=$ primes?

Although $W M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}, Q_{0}\right]$ is undecidable, we have not classified its decision problem in the arithmetic hierarchy. This suggests

Problem 2. Is there a recursive $Q$ such that the decision problem for ( $W$ ) $M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}, Q\right]$ is in $\Sigma_{3} \cap \Pi_{3}$ but not in the Boolean algebra over $\Pi_{2}$ ?

Another interesting question is,
Problem 3. Is there a recursive $Q$ such that $W M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}, Q\right]$ is decidable but $M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}, Q\right]$ is undecidable?

A negative answer to Problem 3 should imply the decidability of $M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}\right]$ as a consequence of the decidability of $W M T\left[N,{ }^{\prime}\right](Q=\varnothing)$. Hence, a negative answer might be quite difficult.

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[^2]
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[^1]:    ${ }^{2}$ Michael O. Rabin has obtained a similar result (personal correspondence).

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