

## two-pass mutual authentication

### Protocol Purpose

Two parties authenticate each other. Aim of the Mutual authentication is to make sure to each of the parties of the other's identity. In this protocol authentication should be achieved by a single encrypted message sent from each party.

### Definition Reference

- [CJ, ISO97]

### Model Authors

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### Alice&Bob style

1. A → B : PK<sub>a,A</sub>, {PK<sub>a,A</sub>}<sub>inv</sub>(PK<sub>s</sub>), Na, B, Text<sub>2</sub>, {Na,B,Text<sub>1</sub>}<sub>inv</sub>(PK<sub>a</sub>)
2. B → A : PK<sub>b,B</sub>, {PK<sub>b,B</sub>}<sub>inv</sub>(PK<sub>s</sub>), Nb, A, Text<sub>4</sub>, {Nb,A,Text<sub>3</sub>}<sub>inv</sub>(PK<sub>b</sub>)

- $inv(PK_s)$  is the private key of the server C
- $\{PK_{a,A}\}_{inv}(PK_s)$  is the certificate of agent A
- $\{PK_{b,B}\}_{inv}(PK_s)$  is the certificate of agent B

### Problems considered: 2

### Attacks Found

The intruder can attack this protocol by simple eavesdropping and replaying the messages.

```
i      -> (a,6) : start
(a,6) -> i      : pka,a,{pka,a}inv(pks),na(a,6),b,ctext2,
```

```

                                {na(a,6),b,ctext1}inv(pka)
i      -> (b,9) : start
(b,9) -> i      : pkb,b,{pkb,b}inv(pks),na(b,9),a,ctext2,
                                {na(b,9),a,ctext1}inv(pkb)
i      -> (a,6) : pkb,b,{pkb,b}inv(pks),na(b,9),a,ctext2,
                                {na(b,9),a,ctext1}inv(pkb)

```

## Further Notes

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## HLPSL Specification

```

role iso3_Init( A, B      : agent,
                Pka, Pks : public_key,
                Snd, Rcv : channel(dy))
played_by A
def=

  local State      : nat,
        Na         : text,
        Nb, Text3, Text4 : text,
        Pkb       : public_key

  init State := 0

  transition

  1. State = 0
    /\ Rcv(start)
    =|>
    State' := 1
    /\ Na' := new()
    /\ Snd(Pka.A.{Pka.A}_inv(Pks).Na'.B.ctext2.{Na'.B.ctext1}_inv(Pka))
    /\ witness(A,B,na,Na')

```

```

2. State = 1
  /\ Rcv(Pkb'.B.{Pkb'.B}_inv(Pks).Nb'.A.Text4'.{Nb'.A.Text3'}_inv(Pkb'))
  =|>
  State' := 2
  /\ wrequest(A,B,nb,Nb')

```

end role

---

```

role iso3_Resp (B, A      : agent,
                Pkb, Pks : public_key,
                Snd, Rcv : channel(dy))
played_by B
def=

  local State      : nat,
        Nb         : text,
        Na,Text1,Text2 : text,
        Pka        : public_key

  init State := 0

  transition

  1. State = 0
    /\ Rcv(Pka'.A.{Pka'.A}_inv(Pks).Na'.B.Text2'.{Na'.B.Text1'}_inv(Pka'))
    =|>
    State' := 1
    /\ Nb' := new()
    /\ Snd(Pkb.B.{Pkb.B}_inv(Pks).Nb'.A.ctext4'.{Nb'.A.ctext3}_inv(Pkb))
    /\ witness(B,A,nb,Nb')
    /\ wrequest(B,A,na,Na')

```

end role

---

```

role session (A, B      : agent,
              Pka, Pkb : public_key,
              Pks      : public_key) def=

```

```
local SA, RA, SB, RB: channel (dy)

composition

    iso3_Init(A,B,Pka,Pks,SA,RA)
    /\ iso3_Resp(B,A,Pkb,Pks,SB,RB)

end role
```

---

```
role environment() def=

    const ctext1, ctext2, ctext3, ctext4 : text,
          na, nb                          : protocol_id,
          a, b                            : agent,
          pka, pkb, pks, pki             : public_key

    intruder_knowledge={a,b,pks,pki,inv(pki)}

    composition

        session(a,b,pka,pkb,pks)
        /\ session(a,b,pka,pkb,pks)
        /\ session(b,a,pkb,pka,pks)

end role
```

---

```
goal

    %IS03_Init weakly authenticates IS03_Resp on nb
    weak_authentication_on nb

    %IS03_Resp weakly authenticates IS03_Init on na
    weak_authentication_on na

end goal
```

---

environment()

## References

- [CJ] J. Clark and J. Jacob. A Survey of Authentication Protocol Literature: Version 1.0, 17. Nov. 1997. URL: [www.cs.york.ac.uk/~jac/papers/drareview.ps.gz](http://www.cs.york.ac.uk/~jac/papers/drareview.ps.gz).
- [ISO97] ISO/IEC. ISO/IEC 9798-3: Information technology - Security techniques - Entity authentication - Part 3: Mechanisms using digital signature techniques, 1997.