# Algorithms and arithmetic for the implementation of cryptographic pairings 

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## What is an elliptic curve?

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with $\operatorname{deg} h \leq 1$ and $\operatorname{deg} f=3$


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- Our favorite curves: $E_{3}: y^{2}=x^{3}-x \pm 1$
- characteristic 3
- supersingular


## Elliptic Curve Cryptography

## Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP)

Let $\mathbb{G}$ be a cyclic group, $P$ a generator, given $Q \in \mathbb{G}$, it is supposed to be hard to compute a such that

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- Use this hard problem to design cryptographic protocols
- Diffie-Hellman key exchange:
- Alice generates a secret integer a
- Alice sends [a]P to Bob
- Alice computes $[a][b] P$
- Bob generates a secret integer $b$
- Bob sends $[b] P$ to Alice
- Bob computes $[b][a] P$

They both share the same secret: $[a b] P$

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- Bilinear map:

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- DLP should be hard on all the groups involved


## Security considerations

- Security measurement
- number of operations to break a cryptosystem
- today's recommendation: 128-bit security
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For our favorite curve $E_{3}$ over $\mathbb{F}_{3509}$
$\ell \approx 2^{697}$
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$k=6$, so DLP in $\left(\mathbb{F}_{36 \cdot 509}\right)^{*}$

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* very recent results (2013)

Records by Joux and Göloğlu et al. records
Joux
Barbulescu, Gaudry, Joux, Thomé
Adj, Menezes, Oliveira, Rodríguez-Henríquez $\lesssim 2^{75}$ operations

## Why cryptography and hardware implementations?

- Growth of numeric exchanges
- many applications
* bank services
* secure firmware updates
* personal communications
* ...
- many targets
$\star$ embedded electronics
* smart cards
* smartphones
* computers, servers
- Security implies non-trivial computations
- Need for hardware implementations
- CPUs may be inadequate
- limited resources



## Hardware implementation

- Our target: Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)
- integrated circuit
- matrix of simple configurable logic cells
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- Different designs for the same computation
- optimized for latency
- optimized for compactness

Computation time


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## Contributions

- Fast accelerator for pairings [CHES 2009, IEEE TC 2011] Joint work with Beuchat, Detrey, Okamoto and Rodríguez-Henríquez
- parallel architecture
- pipelined subquadratic multiplier
- Compact design for pairings reaching 128-bit security
- composite extension fields
- hyperelliptic curves
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Joint work with Aranha, Beuchat and Detrey
- Formulae for sub-quadratic multiplication
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- exhaustive search
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## Outline of the talk

- Compact design through composite extension fields
- Pairing on genus-2 hyperelliptic curves
- Searching for efficient multiplication algorithms
- Conclusion and Perspectives


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- in practice: double-and-add

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| $\#$ iterations | 509 |
| $\times$ | 10330 |
| + | 45170 |
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- triple-and-add algorithm
- Many improvements
- vertical elimination
- use of some curve endomorphisms
* Frobenius: Ate

찬. Verschiebung: Eta, Eta T

## An arithmetic coprocessor



- Only need arithmetic operations in $\mathbb{F}_{3509}$
- implement a specialized processor
- Multiplication is critical
- separate linear operations and multiplications
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- no need for hardware support
- Synthesis results for $\mathbb{F}_{\text {300 }}: 9625$ slices
- almost fully occupy a Virtex 6 LX 75 T (82\%)
- computation time: $\approx 4 \mathrm{~ms}$


## Field of composite extension degree



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- Allows Weil Descent based attacks on the curve
- GHS: using the composite extension degree

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- limited effect on security
- Results
- 1848 slices of the same Virtex 6 LX (15\%) 5.2 times smaller
- compute a pairing in 1.6 ms 2.5 times faster



## Benchmarks



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- Chosen curves

$$
H_{2}: y^{2}+y=x^{5}+x^{3}+d,
$$ with $d \in\{0,1\}$

- characteristic 2



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- Parameters for 128 -bit security
- Embedding degree $k=12$
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| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\#$ iterations | 734 | 245 | 184 | 123 |

- Implementation on the previous coprocessor adapted for $\mathbb{F}_{2^{367}}$
- 1366 slices on the same Virtex 6 LX (12\%)
- 3.2 ms
- comparable performances with the elliptic case


## Benchmarks



## Outline of the talk

- Compact design through composite extension fields
- Pairing on genus-2 hyperelliptic curves
- Searching for efficient multiplication algorithms
- Conclusion and Perspectives


## Origin of the problem

- Polynomial multiplication is an expensive arithmetic operation
- Schoolbook algorithm: quadratic cost


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$$
\left(a_{0}+a_{1} X\right)\left(b_{0}+b_{1} X\right)=a_{0} b_{0}+\left(a_{0} b_{1}+a_{1} b_{0}\right) X+a_{1} b_{1} X^{2}
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& =a_{0} b_{0}+\left(\left(a_{0}+a_{1}\right)\left(b_{0}+b_{1}\right)-a_{0} b_{0}-a_{1} b_{1}\right) X+a_{1} b_{1} X^{2}
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\end{aligned}
$$

- Well-studied problem
- asymptotic complexity
- theoretical bilinear complexity
- small and "cryptographic" size
- Five, six, and seven-term Karatsuba-like formulae, P. Montgomery (2005)
- ad-hoc formulae
- exhaustive search for five-term multiplication
- non-exhaustive search for six and seven-term multiplications
- Our approach: improve the search algorithm


## Generalization of the problem

- Model of a multiplication algorithm



## Generalization of the problem

- Model of a multiplication algorithm

- Also true for any bilinear application
- multiplication in extension fields
- sparse products
- matrix multiplications
- . . .


## Formal framework

Formulation in terms of vector space for an $n \times m$ multiplication over a given field $K$

- Represent the coefficients of the result and the products as elements of
$V$ the $n m$-dimensional $K$-vector space generated by $\left\{a_{i} b_{j}\right\}_{0 \leq i<n, 0 \leq j<m}$ where the $a_{i} b_{j}$ 's are seen as formal elements


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- The set $\mathcal{G}$ of the potential products to use in a formula: the generators
- Goal: find the optimal formulae (i.e. with a minimum number of products)
- for increasing $k$ until a solution is found
- find each subset $\mathcal{W} \subset \mathcal{G}$ of exactly $k$ products
- which gives a valid formula (i.e. that lineary generates the coefficients of the result)

$$
\mathcal{T} \subset \operatorname{Span} \mathcal{W}
$$

## Resolution

- Naive approach: test each subset of $k$ potential products

```
expand_family(\emptyset,\mathcal{G})
procedure expand_family}(\mathcal{W},\mathcal{H}
    if #\mathcal{W}=k then
        if }\mathcal{T}\subsetS\mathrm{ San }\mathcal{W}\mathrm{ then
        W}\mathrm{ is a solution
    else
```

        while \(\mathcal{H} \neq \emptyset\) do
        Pick a \(h\) in \(\mathcal{H}\)
        \(\mathcal{H} \leftarrow \mathcal{H} \backslash\{h\}\)
        expand_family \((\mathcal{W} \cup\{h\}, \mathcal{H})\)
    end procedure

- Complexity depends on

$$
\binom{\# \mathcal{G}}{k}
$$

## Resolution

- Naive approach: test each subset of $k$ potential products
- Better approach: test each vector space of dimension $k$ generated by potential products

```
expand_subspace \((\{0\}, \mathcal{G})\)
procedure expand_subspace \((W, \mathcal{H})\)
    if \(\operatorname{dim} W=k\) then
        if \(\mathcal{T} \subset W\) then
            \(W\) is a solution
    else
        \(\mathcal{H} \leftarrow \mathcal{H} \backslash W\)
        while \(\mathcal{H} \neq \emptyset\) do
            Pick a \(h\) in \(\mathcal{H}\)
            \(\mathcal{H} \leftarrow \mathcal{H} \backslash\{h\}\)
            expand_subspace \((W \oplus \operatorname{Span}(h), \mathcal{H})\)
end procedure
```

- Complexity still depends on

$$
\binom{\# \mathcal{G}}{k}
$$

## Resolution

- Naive approach: test each subset of $k$ potential products
- Better approach: test each vector space of dimension $k$ generated by potential products
- Even better approach: part of the solution is already known, use incomplete basis theorem

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { expand_subspace }(T, \mathcal{G}) \\
& \text { procedure expand_subspace }(W, \mathcal{H}) \\
& \text { if } \operatorname{dim} W=k \text { then } \\
& \text { if } \operatorname{rank}(W \cap \mathcal{G})=k \text { then } \\
& \quad W \text { is a solution } \\
& \text { else } \\
& \mathcal{H} \leftarrow \mathcal{H} \backslash W \\
& \text { while } \mathcal{H} \neq \emptyset \text { do } \\
& \text { Pick a } h \text { in } \mathcal{H} \\
& \mathcal{H} \leftarrow \mathcal{H} \backslash\{h\} \\
& \quad \text { expand_subspace }(W \oplus \operatorname{Span}(h), \mathcal{H}) \\
& \text { end procedure } \\
& \text { Complexity now depends on } \\
& \qquad\binom{\# \mathcal{G}}{k-\operatorname{rank} \mathcal{T}}
\end{aligned}
$$

## Some results

- Multiplication of $n \times m$ term binary polynomials

| Ring | $n \times m$ | \#G | $k$ | \# of <br> tests | \# of solutions | $\# \text { of }$ <br> formulae | Computation time (1 core) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathbb{F}_{2}[X]$ | $2 \times 2$ | 9 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
|  | $3 \times 3$ | 49 | 6 | 9 | 3 | 9 | 0 |
|  | $4 \times 4$ | 225 | 9 | $6.60 \cdot 10^{3}$ | 4 | 4 | 30 ms |
|  | $5 \times 5$ | 961 | 13 | $9.65 \cdot 10^{9}$ | 27 | 27 | 2 d 15 h |
|  | $6 \times 6$ | 3969 | 14 | $4.37 \cdot 10^{9}$ | - | - | 7 d |
|  | $6 \times 6$ | (Sym.) 63 | 17 | $8.08 \cdot 10^{6}$ | 6 | 54 | 18 s |
|  | $7 \times 7$ | (Sym.) 127 | 22 | $3.38 \cdot 10^{12}$ | 2618 | 19550 | 184 d |

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$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathcal{G}=\left\{a_{0} \cdot b_{0},\right. \\
& a_{1} \cdot b_{0}, \\
& \left(a_{0}+a_{1}\right) \cdot b_{0}, \\
& a_{2} \cdot b_{0}, \\
& \left(a_{0}+a_{2}\right) \cdot b_{0}, \\
& a_{0} \cdot b_{1}, \quad a_{1} \cdot b_{1}, \quad\left(a_{0}+a_{1}\right) \cdot b_{1}, \\
& a_{2} \cdot b_{1} \text {, } \\
& \left(a_{0}+a_{2}\right) \cdot b_{1}, \\
& a_{0} \cdot\left(b_{0}+b_{1}\right) \text {, } \\
& a_{0} \cdot b_{2} \text {, } \\
& a_{1} \cdot\left(b_{0}+b_{1}\right) \text {, } \\
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& \text {...\} }
\end{aligned}
$$

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| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $a_{0} \cdot b_{1}$, | $a_{1} \cdot b_{1}$, | $\left(a_{0}+a_{1}\right) \cdot b_{1}$, | $a_{2} \cdot b_{1}$, | $\left(a_{0}+a_{2}\right) \cdot b_{1}$, |
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- in the genus-2 pairing, from 11 to 9 subproducts


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- Optimal formulae for sparse multiplication useful in pairing computation
- in the genus-2 pairing, from 11 to 9 subproducts
- Optimal multiplication for the extensions $\mathbb{F}_{35 m}$
- 11 subproducts instead of 12 previously
- yields a 5\% improvement for the pairing on $E_{3}$


## Outline of the talk

- Compact design through composite extension fields
- Pairing on genus-2 hyperelliptic curves
- Searching for efficient multiplication algorithms
- Conclusion and Perspectives


## Conclusion

- Hardware implementations of pairing
- An algorithm to search for multiplication formulae


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- Unified framework for constructing pairing algorithms
- lot of literature on pairing algorithms
- generally concepts and results only for specific cases
- covers both elliptic and hyperelliptic cases
- covers the different variants of the Tate pairing:
* Ate, Eta, Eta T, optimal Ate, ...


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* Ate, Eta, Eta T, optimal Ate, ...
- General method for cryptographic implementations
- study mathematical structures
- fix parameters thanks to cryptanalysis
- algorithmic optimizations
- choose the right arithmetic representation
- implement different hardware accelerators


## Perspectives

- Lower-level architecture
- FPGA is a good prototyping platform
- but with limited uses in real-life devices
- develop skills in ASIC designs
- power consumption awareness
- Integrate side-channel counter-measures
- side-channel attacks are very effective threats
- embedded systems need to be protected
- Use this method on different cryptographic primitives
- scalar multiplication on hyperelliptic curves
- lattice-based cryptography


[^0]:    - ...

